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Dream-reality confusion in borderline
personality disorder: a theoretical
analysis
Dagna Skrzypin´ska and Barbara Szmigielska*
Unit of Sleep Psychology, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
This paper presents an analysis of dream-reality confusion (DRC) in relation to the
characteristics of borderline personality disorder (BPD), based on research findings
and theoretical considerations. It is hypothesized that people with BPD are more likely
to experience DRC compared to people in non-clinical population. Several variables
related to this hypothesis were identified through a theoretical analysis of the scientific
literature. Sleep disturbances: problems with sleep are found in 15–95.5% of people
with BPD (Hafizi, 2013), and unstable sleep and wake cycles, which occur in BPD
(Fleischer et al., 2012), are linked to DRC. Dissociation: nearly two-thirds of people with
BPD experience dissociative symptoms (Korzekwa and Pain, 2009) and dissociative
symptoms are correlated with a fantasy proneness; both dissociative symptoms and
fantasy proneness are related to DRC (Giesbrecht and Merckelbach, 2006). Negative
dream content: People with BPD have nightmares more often than other people (Semiz
et al., 2008); dreams that are more likely to be confused with reality tend to be more
realistic and unpleasant, and are reflected in waking behavior (Rassin et al., 2001).
Cognitive disturbances: Many BPD patients experience various cognitive disturbances,
including problems with reality testing (Fiqueierdo, 2006; Mosquera et al., 2011), which
can foster DRC. Thin boundaries: People with thin boundaries are more prone to DRC
than people with thick boundaries, and people with BPD tend to have thin boundaries
(Hartmann, 2011). The theoretical analysis on the basis of these findings suggests that
people who suffer from BPD may be more susceptible to confusing dream content with
actual waking events.
Keywords: dream-reality confusion, borderline personality disorder, sleep disturbances, dissociation, cognitive
disturbances, dream content, boundaries
Introduction
Dream-reality confusion (DRC) is a diﬃculty or inability to determine whether an event or
experience occurred during the waking state or whether it was part of a dream. Although, only
few studies on DRC in non-clinical populations have been conducted (e.g., Johnson et al., 1984;
Mazzoni and Loftus, 1996; Rassin et al., 2001; Kemp et al., 2003), DRC has been investigated in
speciﬁc groups, including narcolepsy patients (Wamsley et al., 2014). Research has found that there
is a relationship between DRC and psychotic symptoms (e.g., Hempel et al., 2003), but the authors
of the present paper have not been able to ﬁnd any scientiﬁc studies on the relationship between
DRC and borderline personality disorder (BPD).
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BPD is a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal
relationships, self-image and aﬀect, and marked impulsivity that
begins by early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts
(DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 663). To
qualify for this diagnosis, the person should, among other
symptoms, make a frantic eﬀort to avoid real or imaginary
abandonment, experience a chronic feeling of emptiness or
stress-related temporary paranoid symptoms, or exhibit severe
dissociative symptoms. Moreover, persons with BPD often
engage in self-destructive behaviors and are at signiﬁcant risk
of suicide. Borderline personality disorder aﬀects between 1 and
5.9% of the general population (Torgersen et al., 2001; Aragonés
et al., 2011).
Due to the complex psychopathology of BPD, numerous
studies have examined diﬀerent areas of functioning in
individuals with this disorder. The present theoretical analysis
addresses the question of whether individuals with certain
features of BPD may have diﬃculty distinguishing between
dreams and reality.
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the
current knowledge of DRC in relation to features of BPD.
We hypothesize that BPD subjects are highly predisposed to
experience DRC. This hypothesis is supported by the underlying
assumption that there are groups of interrelated variables that
are present in both DRC and BPD. These variables, which we
identiﬁed through an analysis of the scientiﬁc literature, can
be divided into the following categories: (i) sleep disturbances;
(ii) dissociative symptoms; (iii) negative dream content; (iv)
cognitive disturbances; and (v) thin boundaries. This division was
made on the basis of theoretical considerations; no factor analyzes
have been conducted yet. Each of these ﬁve variables is presented
separately below.
Variables Present in BPD and DRC
Sleep Disturbances
Sleep disturbances, for the purpose of this theoretical analysis,
include a variety of problems with sleep that are discussed below.
Such sleep problems are very common among individuals with
BPD (Haﬁzi, 2013). Though there is little epidemiological data
on sleep disorders among persons diagnosed with BPD, cross-
sectional studies show that sleep disorders are prevalent in 15–
95.5% of this group (e.g., Asaad et al., 2002; Semiz et al., 2008;
Plante et al., 2009; Sansone et al., 2010).
Compared to a non-clinical group, individuals with BPD
take more time to fall asleep, sleep for shorter times, have
lower sleep eﬃciency, and have frequent sleep disturbances
(Semiz et al., 2008). EEG recordings showed, for example, that
study participants in a BPD group, compared to a non-clinical
population, had shorter NREM sleep stages 2 and 4 and longer
NREM sleep stage 1, and had high-voltage delta waves during
NREM sleep (Benson et al., 1990; Philipsen et al., 2005). REM
sleep also was diﬀerent between the groups, with BPD patients
spending more time in REM sleep, which had a longer latency, a
longer ﬁrst episode, and a higher REM density, as well as high-
voltage delta and theta waves in REM sleep, in participants with
BPD (Asaad et al., 2002; Philipsen et al., 2005). Patients with
BPD also have more night awakenings than persons from a non-
clinical population (Battaglia et al., 1993; La Fuente et al., 2001).
Frequent awakenings may lead to diﬃculty determining whether
an event/experience occurred during the waking state or was part
of dream content (Trajanovic et al., 2007).
Labile sleep–wake cycles are another example of sleep
disturbances. They may occur in the course of BPD and they are
correlated with DRC (Fleischer et al., 2012). Labile sleep–wake
cycles may promote the intrusion of dreamlike experiences into
waking consciousness that can lead to DRC and foster the feeling
of depersonalization, which is a dissociative symptom. They also
have an adverse eﬀect on memory, thus favoring the creation
of false memories (van der Kloet et al., 2012). Individuals who
report sleep disturbances score high on dissociative scales, fantasy
proneness (a tendency for deep and long-standing involvement in
fantasy and imagination; Lynn and Rhue, 1988, p. 35) and are
prone to false memories (Giesbrecht and Merckelbach, 2006).
Taken together, the above relationships appear to support
our hypothesis that BPD patients are likely to experience
DRC. It is suggested that a wide range of sleep disturbances,
such as labile sleep–wake cycles, increase the tendency to
experience night awakenings or nightmares (which are discussed
in Section “Negative dream content”) in patients with BPD,which
increases the probability that such persons will have problems
distinguishing whether an event/experience occurred during the
waking state or was part of dream content.
Dissociative Symptoms
Dissociation describes a state of disruption and/or discontinuity
in integrated psychological functioning, such as consciousness,
memory, identity, or perception (DSM-V; American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Dissociative symptoms include,
derealization – the impression that the surrounding world or
reality have changed, depersonalization – feeling as though one is
an outside observer of one’s own self, and amnesia – an inability
to remember, store, and/or evoke memories.
Dissociative states are experienced by approximately 2/3
of patients with BPD (Korzekwa and Pain, 2009). Persons
diagnosed with BPDhave a stronger tendency toward dissociative
symptoms than non-clinical population and individuals who
suﬀer from depression or schizophrenia (Merckelbach et al.,
2005). The occurrence of dissociative symptoms during the
course of BPD may be associated with childhood traumatic
events. According to one of the theories of the etiology of
BPD, this personality disorder develops in individuals who
report that traumatic events were a characteristic of their
early lives, mainly physical abuse and emotional neglect.
A study of 139 patients with BPD found that those who
had high scores on the Dissociative Experience Scale (DES),
which measures the frequency of dissociative symptoms, such
as autobiographical amnesia, derealization, depersonalization,
absorption, and identity alteration (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986),
experienced signiﬁcantly more severe emotional and physical
neglect and emotional and physical abuse (but not sexual
abuse) during childhood than those who had low scores on the
DES (Watson et al., 2006). The results suggest that individuals
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exposed to severe traumatic events during childhood are more
likely to develop dissociative symptoms. Traumatic experiences
may contribute to the development of dissociative symptoms
because trauma-related stress leads to a sudden discontinuity
of the individual’s experience, as it arouses fear about security
and disturbs the connection between the inner and outer
environment. Traumatic experiences also often interfere with the
integration of mental functions, thus, leading to their dysfunction
(Vermetten and Spiegel, 2014). Moreover, dissociative symptoms
involve automatic avoidance strategies that defend consciousness
from traumatic memories (Briere, 2002).
It is noteworthy that dissociative symptoms are one of
the correlates of DRC (Rassin et al., 2001). Levitan (1967,
p. 157) noted that derealization is a compromise between
dreaming and waking. It seems that frequent experiences of
dissociative symptoms or their intensiﬁcation may produce
frequent intrusions of dreams into experiences during the waking
state.
Dissociative symptoms and proneness to fantasy –
characteristics linked to DRC – are correlated, and it appears
this correlation can be mediated by experiences during
sleep (Giesbrecht and Merckelbach, 2006). High fantasy-
prone students report more dissociative symptoms than their
friends who score low or medium on fantasy-proneness
(Rauschenberger and Lynn, 1995; Waldo and Merritt, 2000).
Furthermore, individuals who ﬁnd it diﬃcult to discriminate
between dreams and reality score higher on scales that measure
dissociative symptoms and fantasy proneness than individuals
who do not confuse dream content with experiences during the
waking state (Rassin et al., 2001). A study of 51 women from
the general population found that fantasy proneness is linked
to both dissociative symptoms and everyday cognitive failures
(Merckelbach et al., 1999). Moreover, dissociative symptoms,
fantasy proneness, cognitive failures, and sleep disturbances are
correlated (van Heugten – van der Kloet et al., 2014a). Later in
the current paper, we present data indicating that disturbances
in cognitive functioning are among the variables that increase
proneness to DRC.
The relationship between dissociative symptoms and fantasy
proneness also has been observed in clinical populations.
Merckelbach et al. (2005) demonstrated such relationships in
groups of subjects diagnosed with BPD, schizophrenia, andmajor
depressive disorder . In addition, Steiger et al. (2000) found that
dissociative symptoms were related to impulsivity in persons with
BPD. This association is interesting because impulsivity is one
of the diagnostic features of BPD (DSM-V, American Psychiatric
Association, 2013).
To summarize, the above ﬁndings support our hypothesis that
individuals with diagnosed BPD are more likely to experience
DRC because of their tendency to experience dissociative
symptoms and related phenomena, such as fantasy proneness,
sleep disturbances, and cognitive problems.
Negative Dream Content
Individuals suﬀering from BPD experience more negative life
events than other individuals – even those with other personality
disorders (Pagano et al., 2004). According to the classical
continuity hypothesis (Hall and Nordby, 1972; Schredl, 2003),
dreaming reﬂects the dreamer’s waking life experience, therefore,
the dream content of patients with BPD may be more negative
that the dream content of other people. The quantitative
analysis of a group of 27 individuals diagnosed with BPD and
a non-clinical group of 20 individuals showed that the BPD
group had dreams with more negative aﬀect than those in the
non-clinical group. Generally, individuals suﬀering from BPD
experience negative dreams, including nightmares, more often
than individuals who do not have any of the characteristic
symptoms of this personality disorder (Schredl et al., 2012).
Nightmares are sleep disturbances that are related to sleep
disorders. They are deﬁned as vivid dreams, charged with
negative emotions that awaken the dreamer from sleep (DSM-V;
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). About 49% of patients
with BPD are troubled by nightmares, whereas the prevalence
of nightmares in the non-clinical population is estimated to be
about 4–10% (Levin and Nielsen, 2007; Simor et al., 2010). The
higher frequency of nightmares among BPD patients compared
to the non-clinical population is related to greater emotional
instability and heightened neuroticism in this clinical group
(Simor et al., 2010). The intensity of BPD symptoms is positively
correlated with the frequency of nightmares (Semiz et al., 2008).
To try to explain the prevalence of nightmares in persons with
BPD, we present two theories: a nightmare model proposed by
Levin and Nielsen (2007), and the Emotional Cascade Model
developed by Selby et al. (2013).
Levin and Nielsen (2007) proposed a theory to explain the
occurrence of dysphoric dreaming, which is based on two major
assumptions: cross-state continuity and multilevel explanation.
The ﬁrst, cross-state continuity, assumes that some structures and
processes implicated in nightmare production are also engaged
during the expression of pathological signs and symptoms such as
dissociative symptoms during the waking state (Levin and Nielsen,
2007, p. 495). The second, themultilevel explanation, refers to the
idea that nightmare formation can be explained at two diﬀerent
levels: the cognitive–emotional level and the neuronal level. At
the cognitive–emotional level, there are imagery processes that
represent emotional dream imagery, whereas the neuronal level
contains a network of brain regions responsible for imagistic
and emotional processes. This model was created to explain the
occurrence of nightmares in the course of posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD); however, it may also be used in an attempt
to describe experiences related both to nightmares and cross-
state continuity in patients diagnosed with BPD. We will not
discuss the concept of neuronal correlates of DRC and BPD,
as this is beyond the scope of the present article. Instead, we
will focus on the notion of cross-state continuity with reference
to BPD. In their model, Levin and Nielsen (2007) consider a
number of factors that underlie cross-state continuity, such as
aﬀect load – a state factor is the combined inﬂuence of stressful
and emotionally negative events on an individual’s capacity to
eﬀectively regulate emotions (p. 497), and aﬀect distress – a trait
factor is a long-standing, dispositional tendency to experience
heightened distress and negative aﬀect, and to react with extreme
behavioral expressions (p. 498). Other factors include high degrees
of physiological and psychological reactivity, maladaptive coping,
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fantasy proneness, imagery vividness, and thin boundaries.
Numerous studies suggest that almost all of these factors are
usually present during the course of BPD, however more
recent studies indicate that there is no heightened physiological
reactivity in BPD (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Merckelbach et al., 2005;
Hunt, 2007; Kuo and Linehan, 2009; Hartmann, 2011; Mosquera
et al., 2011; Cavazzi and Becerra, 2014). Persons diagnosed
with this personality disorder are characterized by emotional
dysregulation, which is the inability to ﬂexibly respond to and
manage emotions, entailing emotional sensitivity, heightened
and labile negative aﬀect, a deﬁcit of appropriate regulation
strategies, and a surplus of maladaptive regulation strategies
(Carpenter and Trull, 2013). In addition, BPD entails aﬀective
instability and a low level of emotion recognition (Cole et al.,
2009).
According to Linehan’s (1993) biosocial theory, which explains
the etiology of BPD, this personality disorder develops in children
(i) who have a biological propensity to experience negative aﬀect,
and (ii) who are in an invalidating and toxic social environment.
In BPD, the biological sensitivity to emotional stimuli, heightened
negative aﬀect, and a slow return to emotional baseline are
connected with diﬃculty in discriminating and labeling one’s
own emotional states, initiating adequate coping strategies to
manage these emotional states, and being able to reduce intense
negative aﬀective states. Studies conﬁrm that BPD patients
display a negative distortion in the identiﬁcation of their own
emotional states and the emotional states of other persons (e.g.,
Morey, 2014). The inability to accurately recognize emotional
states may intensify negative aﬀect, emotional instability, and
emotional reactivity in everyday life. Furthermore, patients
with BPD are unable to tolerate distress and they usually use
maladaptive regulation strategies to cope with distress and
the negative emotions they experience, such as ruminations,
impulsive behaviors, or cognitive avoidance (Carpenter and
Trull, 2013). Disorders of emotional processes in patients with
BPD seem to occur not only in the waking state, but also during
dreaming, as in the case of nightmares (Simor et al., 2010). We
hypothesize that waking and dreaming states may involve similar
experiences; therefore, persons with BPD may have diﬃculty
discriminating whether an event/experience occurred during the
waking state or was part of dream content.
Emotional dysregulation, which is one of the factors associated
with nightmares in Levin and Nielsen’s (2007) theory, is also
mentioned by Selby et al. (2013) in their Emotional Cascade
Model (ECM). The ECM attempts to explain the etiology of
bad dreams experienced in the course of BPD. The eﬀects
of nightmares and other bad dreams, apart from the fear
they produce, can involve deﬁcits in appropriate emotion-
regulation skills, and decrease ability to cope with distress
during the subsequent day, according to the ECM. Patients
with BPD experience emotional cascades during the waking
state, and this negative aﬀect induces rumination – repetitive
thoughts with mainly negative content. Ruminations increase
negative aﬀect, which, in turn, intensify ruminations. These
processes result in increased cognitive activity during sleep
that favors the appearance of nightmares and maladaptive
behaviors during the waking state that are intended to cope
with negative emotions. It seems that frequent nightmares in
persons with BPD may inﬂuence the occurrence of negative
life events (Selby et al., 2013). Generally, a simpliﬁed model
of emotional cascades assumes the subsequent occurrence of:
negative emotional experiences during wakefulness −→ increase
in ruminations −→ escalation of negative emotions −→ increase
in ruminations −→ a very aversive emotional state−→ / possible
dysfunctional coping skills connected with aﬀect regulation (e.g.,
self-harm, substance use) /−→ elevated cognitive activity during
sleep connected with emotional cascades during the waking
state −→ nightmares that are sleeping emotional cascades −→
nightmares may increase negative aﬀect and vulnerability to
stressors during wakefulness−→ negative emotional experiences
during wakefulness. . . (for a detailed description, see Selby et al.,
2013).
Elevated cognitive arousal during sleep may cause awakenings
or semi-awakenings, which consequently may lead to diﬃculty
distinguishing between dreaming and waking experiences
(Trajanovic et al., 2007; Selby et al., 2013). In addition, the
inability to cope eﬀectively with stressful situations may enhance
the tendency toward dissociative states (Mosquera et al., 2011),
which ﬁnally may result in an increased proneness to DRC.
Moreover, a study by Rassin et al. (2001) demonstrated that
dreams that are more likely to be confused with reality are
realistic, permeated with negative aﬀect, and give rise to behavior
in the waking state. Yet, because BPD patients havemore negative
experiences in both the waking state and sleeping state and more
cognitive disturbances, theymay havemore diﬃculty recognizing
whether an event/experience occurred during the waking state
or was part of a dream. Taken together, the ﬁndings suggest that
frequent unpleasant dream content in BPD may be a factor that
increases proneness to DRC.
Cognitive Disturbances
Patients with BPD can experience a number of diﬀerent cognitive
disturbances. These include problems with metacognitive
monitoring, which refers to the ability to observe one’s own
thinking processes, as well to detect errors in one’s own reasoning,
and inconsistencies in one’s own narrations. Metacognitive
monitoring refers to “thinking about thinking.” Metacognitive
knowledge, which is the ability to notice that some things/events
may not be as they appear to be, is also distorted in BPD
(Sharma and Singh, 2012). Usually, executive functions, such as
working memory and response inhibition, also are disturbed in
BPD (Hagenhoﬀ et al., 2013). Moreover, BPD is characterized
by deﬁcits in feedback processing, altered social inference, and
poor decision-making skills (Trivedi, 2006; Mak and Lam, 2013).
Generally, four types of cognitive disturbances are distinguished
in BPD: (i) transient, quasi-psychotic cognition, (ii) dissociation,
(iii) social cognitive biases, and (iv) neurocognition (Fertuck and
Stanley, 2006). A detailed description of cognitive problems in
BPD, however, remains beyond the scope of the present paper.
What is important is that problems with reality testing
may occur in patients with BPD (Fiqueierdo, 2006). Reality
monitoring, which is related to reality testing, seems to play
a signiﬁcant role in the process of distinguishing dream
content from waking experiences. Reality monitoring, a type
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of source monitoring, is deﬁned as the ability to discriminate
between memories of actual events, and memories of dreamed
events, imagination, or delusions. Reality monitoring consists
of two decision-making processes: (i) evaluation of whether the
characteristics of a memory trace are more typical of memories
of external events or memories generated internally; and (ii)
evaluation based on present memory/knowledge, which is a
more complex process and takes more time. Memory source
is distinguished on the basis of its characteristics: memories of
actual events include more perceptual and contextual details,
whereas memories of consciously imagined events include traces
of cognitive operations that were involved in their creation.
Dreams are classiﬁed as internally generated events, which are
diﬃcult to distinguish from similar, external events because they
are created without conscious cognitive operations (Johnson
et al., 1984). In the case of dreams, conscious cognition, which
is the most important cue that would help diﬀerentiate between
internally generated memories and those generated externally
is not present. These conclusions indicate that DRC may be
associated with diﬃculty with reality monitoring.
The temporary suspension of the source monitoring process,
along with reduced ability to respond to a sensory stimulus
and reduced attention, is one of the common features of both
dreaming and waking fantasy. These processes may make it
more diﬃcult to distinguish between the content generated
during dreaming and waking fantasy. Both waking fantasy
and dreams play an integral role in mood regulation, adaptive
information processing, and maintenance of self-cohesion by
providing working templates for future goal-directed behavior
and the development and maintenance of self-schemas (Levin
and Young, 2002). BPD patients exhibit certain cognitive
disturbances that make them more prone to problems related to
reality testing, and waking fantasy may also disturb the processes
involved in correct source monitoring. Furthermore, it seems that
mood regulation is disturbed in BPD because of more negative
dream content and emotional cascades at night (Selby et al.,
2013). Cognitive and emotional processes during dreaming and
wakefulness interact, and their interaction may contribute to
diﬃculty in distinguishing whether an event/experience occurred
during the waking state or in a dream.
Moreover, individuals who are more likely to make cognitive
mistakes are less likely to trust their cognitive skills (van
Heugten – van der Kloet et al., 2014a); thus, they may be more
responsive to suggestions from other people. We hypothesize
that people with BPD who have some cognitive deﬁcits will
trust their cognitive processes less because they are not sure if
their perception of reality is correct. Our assumption is that due
to their cognitive disturbances, persons with BPD, compared
to non-clinical populations, more often will be unsure what
the source of certain events or experiences are (dream vs.
reality), and may even make incorrect judgments about their
source. The diﬃculty that BPD patients encounter in reality
testing (Fiqueierdo, 2006) and their problems with metacognitive
monitoring and metacognitive knowledge (Sharma and Singh,
2012) seem to be the only examples of cognitive disturbances that
could lead to a higher probability of experiencing DRC, compared
to people from non-clinical populations.
Thin Boundaries
The concept of boundaries, which was deﬁned by Hartmann
(2011), refers to a wide spectrum of boundaries in the
mind, including interpersonal boundaries (the self vs. others),
boundaries between the self and the outside world, and
boundaries between diﬀerent states of consciousness (e.g., the
waking state or dreaming state). Thus, boundaries refer to:
(i) connectedness among various aspects of the mind (i.e.,
the relationships among thoughts, emotions, and memory),
including relationships among the personal past, future, and
present; and (ii) connectedness between the self and the
outside world (Hartmann, 2011). People have been characterized
as having thin or thick boundaries (Hartmann et al., 1991;
Hartmann, 2011). As boundaries are generally stable across
situations, there is a high probability that individuals with thin
boundaries in certain areas will have thin boundaries in other
areas (Hartmann, 2011).
Patients with BPD tend to have thin boundaries (Hartmann,
2011), and individuals with thin boundaries have higher dream
recall than those with thick boundaries. They also experience
more emotions in their dreams, have dreams that are more
negative and emotionally intense, dream more frequently about
verbal interactions with others, and regard their dreams as
more meaningful and creative (Schredl et al., 1999). A higher
dream recall and other vivid night experiences are associated
with a greater tendency for absorption, which is a state of
heightened imaginative involvement in which an individual’s
attention capacities are focused in the behavioral domain, often
to the exclusion of explicit information-processing in other
domains and fantasizing (Levin and Young, 2002, p. 203). Levin
and Young (2002) demonstrated that absorption is correlated
with heightened creativity, a tendency toward dissociation,
and increased involvement in imagination-based activities, with
concomitant alterations in consciousness (Levin and Young,
2002). In this context, it may be interesting to raise questions
as to whether a greater ability to recall dreams increases the
probability that dream content will be confused with real events.
As BPD patients have a greater tendency for absorption (Zanarini
et al., 2000), they would experience DRC more frequently,
perhaps in connection with other variables discussed in this
paper.
Thin boundaries seem to enhance the intrusion of dreamlike
content into consciousness in the waking state, which may
lead to diﬃculty distinguishing whether an event/experience
occurred during the waking state or in a dream (Hartmann,
2011). Additionally, these intrusions may favor the occurrence of
dissociative symptoms, which as mentioned above, are correlated
with DRC (Rassin et al., 2001; van Heugten – van der Kloet et al.,
2014a). Taken together, these data suggest that individuals with
thin boundaries may be more prone to DRC. Thus, it is possible
that patients diagnosed with BPD also may be more prone to
DRC. Given the above considerations, it would be interesting
to conduct studies on the relationship between creativity and
DRC in BPDpopulations and non-clinical populations. Although
a recent study by van Heugten – van der Kloet et al. (2015)
found a moderate correlation between state dissociation and
creativity, no signiﬁcant correlation was found between creativity
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and unusual sleep experiences. Future studies should include
DRC as a construct to elucidate its relationship with creativity.
Conclusions
The variables that may lead to an increased tendency to
experience DRC in patients with BPD were described in
the preceding paragraphs. Taking everything into account, we
propose a tentative model that patients with BPD are more
prone than non-clinical population to experience diﬃculty or
an inability to determine whether an event/experience occurred
during the waking state or was part of a dream.
Patients with diagnosed BPD may be more prone to
experience dissociative symptoms because of traumatic events
in their early childhood (Watson et al., 2006), and dissociative
symptoms are correlates of DRC (Rassin et al., 2001). Thus,
the greater tendency toward dissociative symptoms among
persons with BPDmay make them uncertain whether something
they remember happened in their dreams or while they
were awake. Dissociative symptoms are correlated with fantasy
proneness, which is also correlated with DRC (Rassin et al.,
2001; Merckelbach et al., 2005; Giesbrecht and Merckelbach,
2006). Furthermore, persons with BPD often suﬀer from
various sleep disorders (Haﬁzi, 2013), and sleep disorders
(for instance, nightmares) and unusual sleep experiences are
related to dissociative symptoms and to DRC (Giesbrecht and
Merckelbach, 2006; van Heugten – van der Kloet et al., 2014b).
Moreover, patients with BPD experience negative emotions
during wakefulness that are related to negative emotional
experiences during dreaming (Selby et al., 2013). This process
may also be connected to elevated cognitive arousal during
sleeping that causes awakenings or semi-awakenings, which
consequently lead to diﬃculty distinguishing between dreaming
and waking experiences (Trajanovic et al., 2007; Selby et al.,
2013). In addition, dreams that are more likely to be confused
with reality are realistic, evoke negative emotions, and give rise
to behavior in the waking state (Rassin et al., 2001). The dream
content of patients with BPD is more negative than the dream
content of individuals in non-clinical populations, and people
with BPD tend to experience a number of diﬀerent cognitive
disturbances, such as problems with reality testing, metacognitive
deﬁcits, altered social inference, poor decision-making skills, or
cognitive distortions (Fiqueierdo, 2006; Trivedi, 2006; Wenzel
et al., 2006; Schredl et al., 2012; Sharma and Singh, 2012; Mak
and Lam, 2013). We hypothesize that due to the feedback loop
of negative aﬀect during dreaming and wakefulness, cognitive
disturbances, and increased impulsivity, patients with BPD may
take actions after awakening that are based on their dream
content, because they are convinced that these events happened
in reality. Moreover, people with BPD are characterized by thin
boundaries (Hartmann, 2011), which may further enhance the
confusion between dreams and wakefulness.
This theoretical analysis, including such variables as sleep
disturbances, dissociative symptoms, negative dream content,
cognitive dysfunction, and thin boundaries leads to the
proposition that patients with BPD may be more prone to DRC,
compared to non-clinical population. Future research on the
general working model should involve the use of factor analysis
and structural equationmodeling in order to identify and conﬁrm
important variables and explore the complex relationships among
these variables.
We plan to conduct empirical veriﬁcation of these
relationships. The aim of this extensive research program is
not only to examine whether patients with BPD are more
vulnerable than other people to experience DRC, but to study
comprehensively the psychological and neuropsychological
aspects of sleep and dreams, using subjective and objective
methods, on a continuum: BPD – some features of BPD – lack of
BPD.
The theoretical analysis presented above is exploratory in
nature and is intended to serve as a starting point for further,
more advanced analyses, and to provide a theoretical basis for
planning empirical studies.
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